Section 5: First Amendment & Election Law by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
2003
Section 5: First Amendment & Election Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 2003 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 5: First Amendment & Election Law" (2003). Supreme
Court Preview. 163.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/163
02-1580 Vieth v. Jubelirer
Ruling Below: (Vieth v. Pennsylvania, M.D. Pa., 241 F. Supp. 2d 478)
Partisan gerrymandering in redrawing congressional district lines does not violate equal
protection clause of 14th Amendment in absence of facts indicating that persons complaining of
redistricting have been shut out of political process.
Question Presented: (1) Did district court err in effectively concluding that voters affiliated
with major political party may never state claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering,
thereby nullifying this court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)? (2) Does
state presumptively violate equal protection clause when it subordinates all traditional, neutral
districting principles to overarching goal of drawing congressional redistricting map that
achieves maximum partisan advantage for members of one political party? (3) Does state exceed
its delegated power under Art. I of Constitution when it draws congressional district boundaries
to ensure that candidates from one political party will consistently capture supermajority of
state's congressional seats even if those candidates win less than half of popular vote statewide?
Richard VIETH, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey, Plaintiffs
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants
United States District Court,
M.D. Pennsylvania
Decided January 24, 2003.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted]
PER CURIAM.
Before the court are Plaintiffs' motion to
impose remedial districts and
Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The parties have briefed the
issue, as has amicus curiae.
Additionally, the parties have presented
oral argument on the instant motion.
Accordingly, the matter is ripe for
disposition.
1. Background
This case involves an ongoing challenge
to Pennsylvania's congressional
redistricting effort. The Commonwealth
initiated the redistricting process in
response to the year 2000 decennial
census which indicated that
Pennsylvania would lose two seats in
Congress due to shifts in the national
population. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth enacted its initial
redistricting plan. That plan has been
referred to throughout this litigation as
Act 1.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs initiated the
instant suit seeking to have Act 1
declared unconstitutional, based on the
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following constitutional doctrines: (1) as
an unconstitutional gerrymander in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution; (2) as
a violation of the
principal of the one person-one vote
doctrine as that doctrine is embodied in
Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause; (3) as a
violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (4) as a violation of
Plaintiffs' right to political association
pursuant to the First Amendment. In
accordance with the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2284, Chief Judge Edward
Becker of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit appointed
the present three judge panel to hear the
challenge.
By an order dated February 22, 2002, the
court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims,
save for the one person-one vote claim.
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188
F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.Pa.2002)
[hereinafter "Vieth I "]. On March 11
and 12, 2002, the court held an
evidentiary hearing on that claim. On
April 8, 2002, the court issued an
opinion and order in which a majority of
the court held that Act I violated the
dictates of one person-one vote and
enjoined its implementation. See Vieth
v. Pennsylvania, 195 F.Supp.2d 672, 679
(M.D.Pa.2002) [hereinafter "Vieth II "].
Additionally, the court granted the
Pennsylvania General Assembly three
weeks to submit a plan that would
remedy the constitutional deficiencies in
Act 1. Id.
Accordingly, on April 17, 2002, the
General Assembly enacted a revised
congressional redistricting plan. The
next day, Governor Schweiker signed
into law the new plan, Act 34. That bill
repealed Act I and replaced it with Act
34's boundaries. Defendants then
petitioned the court to stay its decision
regarding Act 1 and to allow the 2002
congressional elections to proceed under
Act l's boundaries. Because primary
elections were set to be held on May 21,
2002, the court agreed to stay its
decision regarding Act 1 in order to
allow the primary election to take place
as scheduled. Therefore, Act 34 was not
in operation for the congressional
elections that took place in November of
2002. However, Act 34 is scheduled to
govern the next round of congressional
elections in November of 2004.
Ostensibly, Act 34 is a zero-deviation
congressional redistricting plan. That is,
the district-to-district populations vary
by only one person, the minimum
variation given that Pennsylvania's
population does not divide into nineteen
even districts. On April 22, 2002,
Plaintiffs filed a motion for the court to
impose remedial districts or, in the
alternative, to begin remedial hearings.
Through information presented in that
motion, the court learned for the first
time of a decision by the Court of
Common Pleas for Armstrong County,
Pennsylvania. That decision was issued
on March 15, 2002 - after enactment of
Act 1, but before Act 34's enactment.
The decision effectively altered the
boundary between two voter precincts in
Armstrong County - South Buffalo
District Western and South Buffalo
District Eastern. Those two precincts
also represented the line dividing the 3rd
and 12th Congressional Districts under
both Act I and Act 34. The alteration
had the effect of moving forty-nine
people from the 12th Congressional
District to the 3rd Congressional
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District. Apparently, this would have
resulted in Act 34 having a deviation of
ninety-seven between its most and least
populated districts. This number would
have represented a deviation over fives
times greater than that in Act 1. On May
16, 2002, the Commonwealth enacted
another statute, Act 44, seeking to
retroactively rescind the Armstrong
County Court's ability to alter voter
precinct boundaries.
The Board of Elections for Armstrong
County then petitioned the Armstrong
County Court of Common Pleas to
vacate its decision altering the voter
precinct boundary. By an order dated
July 29, 2002, the Armstrong County
Court of Common Pleas denied the
motion to vacate its decision.
Eventually, this court scheduled a
hearing for January 9, 2003 for the
parties to present oral argument
regarding whether Act 34 remedied the
constitutional defect that the court found
rendered Act 1 infirm.
In the interim, Governor Schweiker
signed Act 150 into law on December 9,
2002. That statute amended § 506 of the
Pennsylvania Election Code to add the
following statement:
In administering elections for the
nomination and election of candidates
for the United States House of
Representatives and the General
Assembly, county boards of election
shall adhere to the following rule: Where
an election district is used in or pursuant
to a congressional redistricting statute or
the final plan of the Legislative
Reapportionment Commission to define
the boundary of a congressional district
or state legislative district, the boundary
of such election shall be the boundary
existing and recognized by the
Legislative Reapportionment
Commission for the adoption of its final
plan. The boundaries of the
Congressional districts, as established by
statute, and state legislative districts as
set forth in the final plan of the
Legislative Reapportionment
Commission shall remain in full force
and effect for use thereafter until the
next reapportionment or redistricting as
required by law and shall not be deemed
to be affected by any action taken
pursuant to this title.
Therefore, Act 150 had the apparent
effect of negating the alteration of the
boundary dividing the 3rd and 12th
Congressional Districts. Defendants
subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment on December 20, 2002. On
December 30, 2002, the court issued an
order indicating that the parties should
be prepared to present oral argument on
this motion at the January 9 hearing and
that Plaintiffs should file their brief in
opposition to summary judgment before
the date of the hearing. On January 7,
2002, Plaintiffs filed their response to
Defendants' summary judgment motion.
On January 9, 2002, the court held its
hearing.
The court's order of April 8, 2002 gave
Defendants a period of time to "enact
and submit for review and final approval
by this Court, a congressional
redistricting plan in conformity with this
opinion." See Vieth 11, 195 F.Supp.2d at
679. In response, the Commonwealth
enacted Act 34. In accordance with the
matters discussed at the January 9
hearing, the court finds that Act 34
sufficiently remedies the constitutional
deficiencies of Act 1. Our hearing, was
basically a review of Act 34 and we are
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now giving final approval to it. For the
reasons stated below, the court finds that
Act 34 does not violate any
constitutional doctrine. The court,
therefore, will deny Plaintiffs' motion to
impose remedial districts. This decision
renders Defendants' motion for summary
judgment moot. The court, therefore,
will not address that motion.
II. Analysis
C. Partisan Gerrymandering
Plaintiffs also seek to preserve their
argument that Act 34 is a partisan
gerrymandering and, thus, violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed
earlier, Plaintiffs presented the same
argument with respect to Act 1. In Vieth
I, the court dismissed this claim because
"Plaintiffs [did not] allege facts
indicating that they have been shut out
of the political process and, therefore,
they cannot establish an actual
discriminatory effect on them," as
required by Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85
(1986). Vieth I, 188 F.Supp.2d 532, 547
(M.D.Pa.2002). Act 34 is essentially the
same redistricting plan as Act 1, except
for the fact that Act 34 does not possess
an avoidable population deviation.
Accordingly, whatever partisan effect
Act I had, Act 34 will have as well. The
court, therefore, incorporates by
reference its discussion in Vieth I
regarding partisan gerrymandering and
holds that the undisputed facts in this
case are insufficient to establish such a
claim. See id. at 543-47.
IV. Conclusion
Act 34 does not violate the principal of
one person-one vote. Therefore, Act 34
remedies Act l's constitutional defect.
Additionally, Act 34 is not a partisan
gerrymandering, at least as far as that
term is defined by the Supreme Court in
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106
S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986).
Therefore, the court will deny Plaintiffs
motion to impose remedial districts.
Because the court has decided that Act
34 cures the constitutional defect found
by the court in its memorandum and
order of April 8, 2002, Defendants'
motion for summary judgment is moot.
An appropriate order will issue.
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Supreme Court Takes up State Redistricting
The New York Times
June 28, 2003
By Linda Greenhouse
Taking up a highly charged issue of
partisan politics, the Supreme Court
agreed today to decide whether
Pennsylvania's Democrats were victims
of an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander at the hands of the
Republican controlled Legislature in
Congressional redistricting after the
2000 census.
The case will be argued in the court's
next term. It was one of five new appeals
that the justices granted on a final
cleanup day before the summer recess.
In the absence of any retirement
announcements in this final week, the
prospect that any member of the court is
planning to retire this year appears
extremely remote, last-minute rumors to
the contrary.
Pennsylvania, where registered
Democrats outnumber Republicans by
3.7 million to 3.2 million, lost two seats
in the House of Representatives as a
result of the last census. The Legislature
then drew new district lines with the
goal of favoring Republicans to the
greatest degree possible.
In two districts, pairs of Democratic
incumbents were required to run against
one another. Another Democratic
incumbent was placed in a heavily
Republican district. Counties were split
and districts given highly irregular
shapes in order to create Republican
supermajorities.
As a result, the state's Congressional
delegation went from 11 Republicans and
10 Democrats to 12 Republicans and 7
Democrats.
Three Democratic voters sued in federal
court, claiming that the redistricting had
deprived them of their right to equal
protection. A 1986 Supreme Court
decision in a partisan gerrymandering
case from Indiana opened the door to
this constitutional argument, but the
decision provided few guidelines for its
application and has been invoked
reluctantly and inconsistently in the
lower courts.
A special three-judge federal district
court in Harrisburg dismissed the
Democrats' case on the ground that they
had not demonstrated sufficient injury,
which the court defined as being
"completely shut out of the political
process." In their appeal, the Democrats
are asking the justices to take a new look
at the 1986 precedent, Davis v.
Bandemer, and "clarify that extreme
partisan gerrymandering is not only
justifiable in theory but remediable in
actual practice."
For their part, the Republican legislative
leaders are asking the court instead to
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overturn the precedent and remove
political gerrymanders from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. This
was the position expressed in dissent in
the 1986 case by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, who was then an associate
justice. Warren E. Burger, who was then
chief justice, also dissented in Davis v.
Bandemer.
The Pennsylvania legislative leaders told
the justices in the case today that the
fears the dissenters expressed in 1986
had come to pass as partisan battles were
shifting from the political arena to the
courts.
"To permit challenges to duly-enacted
Congressional redistricting legislation on
the basis of partisan gerrymandering
delegitimizes the political process," the
Republicans' brief said.
The case is "incredibly significant," said
one election law expert, Richard Pildes
of New York University Law School. He
said gerrymanders of one kind or another
have helped create district maps that
have left the great majority of House
seats uncompetitive.
Partisan gerrymander battles have
erupted in Michigan and Florida. In
Texas last month, House Democratic
lawmakers fled to Oklahoma to deprive
Republicans of a quorum for a
redistricting plan, while in Colorado,
Republicans succeeded last month in
accomplishing a favorable and highly
unusual second post-census redistricting.
"We are losing the ability to put on
meaningful elections," Professor Pildes
said in an interview. "It's become a
terrible problem in the system. It's
become almost like the Middle East --
both sides recognize that the situation
isn't good, but they can't let go. There
needs to be outside intervention."
He said the court's decision to hear the
case, Vieth v. Jubelirer, No. 02-1580,
might reflect the justices' recognition of
a problem that requires their attention.
The Pennsylvania Democrats,
represented by a Washington lawyer,
Paul M. Smith, quoted judges and
scholars who have recently called on the
court to address partisan
gerrymandering. Richard A. Posner, the
federal appeals court judge in Chicago,
argued in a recent book that "judicial
insouciance" toward partisan
gerrymanders and the creation of safe
seats had undermined "electoral
competition, the lifeblood of
democracy."
In rejecting the Democrats' case, the
district court in Pennsylvania said that in
order to bring a successful challenge to a
partisan gerrymander, plaintiffs must
show that they have been not only
outmaneuvered, but also cut out of the
political process, to the extent of not
being able to register, organize,
campaign or raise money.
This was a good 24 hours for Mr. Smith,
the Democrats' lawyer; he made the
winning argument in the gay rights case
the court decided on Thursday. By
coincidence, Bowers v. Hardwick, the
precedent the court overruled on
Thursday, was decided on the same day
in 1986 as Davis v. Bandemer, the
gerrymander decision at the center of the
new appeal.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
The place to start is the breakthrough case of
Davis v. Bandemer," in which the Court
first recognized a claim of unconstitutional
discrimination in the redistricting context
based on partisanship rather than the
familiar equal protection category of racial
classifications. In Davis, the Court
grounded its constitutional concerns in the
ability of political insiders to manipulate
electoral boundaries to magnify their
political power and frustrate the legitimate
aspirations of their political rival, defined
for all practical purposes as one or another
of the two major parties. The conceptual
underpinning of the Court's analysis in
Davis is undeveloped but appears to rest on
an unelaborated intuition of unfairness to the
political party not enjoying the bounties of
incumbent power. Davis introduces the
actionable claim of political vote dilution, an
uncomfortable analogue of the concept of
minority vote dilution, which in turn is an
extension of antidiscrimination law. But the
analogy breaks down across many
dimensions, and the unfortunate result is a
new equal protection doctrine with an
impossibly high burden of proof for actually
making out a claim. As described below,
the end result is a legal standard of
potentially sweeping breadth but of virtually
no meaningful application.
The conceptual weakness in how the Court
has treated the potential for mischievous
manipulation of redistricting is evident in a
less criticized earlier case, Gaffney v.
Cummings.14  There, the Court found
unobjectionable a political compromise
between the Democrats and Republicans of
Connecticut to partition the state so as to
lock in the political status quo ante. The
Court reasoned that there could be no
partisan harm, regardless of the geographic
contortions of the district lines, when the
two parties had negotiated a redistricting
plan without either of them seeking to
exploit the other for legislative gain. The
Connecticut experiment in a negotiated
division of power, which political scientist
Bruce Cain terms a "bipartisan
gerrymander,"16  does not present the
problem of discrimination against one of the
parties and thereby avoids the equal
protection framework the Court has
employed thus far. Put another way, if a
legislative plan were to provide the two
major political parties with reasonable
prospects of achieving what they believed to
be their appropriate shares of representation,
14 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
16 Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle 159-
66 (1984).
163
" 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
what could be objectionable in such a
coalition effort? From the vantage point of
equal protection law, neither party should be
considered a victim of discrimination under
such a sharing of electoral opportunity.
The label "bipartisan gerrymander"
suggests that there may be grounds for
concern but does not elucidate the exact
source of that concern. The invocation of
the gerrymandering label may express an
aesthetic objection to the contours of the
districting lines, or it may hint at the stench
of backroom politics improperly shielded
from public scrutiny, but it does not capture
any substantive conception of what is wrong
with the outcome when the two incumbent
parties carve up the state into mutually
acceptable bailiwicks.
II. Gerrymandering as a Harm
A useful starting point in examining the
relation between constitutional law and
politics is the question of political
gerrymandering as defined through Davis v.
Bandemer. Of all the Supreme Court's
forays into the political process after the
reapportionment cases of the 1960s, the
political gerrymandering cause of action
enunciated in Davis leaves the smallest trail
in the actual political life of the country.
Certainly when compared to the compelled
decennial redistricting occasioned by Baker
and Reynolds, or the limitation on campaign
finance reform after Buckley v. Valeo, or
the representation of minorities in the wake
of the vote dilution cases and then the Shaw
line of cases, the constitutional concern over
partisan distortions enunciated in Davis
fades into quick oblivion. Most evidently,
unlike in any other area of legal oversight of
the political process, the definition of the
constitutional harm involved in partisan
gerrymandering has remained frustratingly
imprecise. While other areas of the law
settled on judicially recognizable concepts,
such as one person, one vote, the evidentiary
standard for partisan gerrymandering never
moved beyond a concern over an ill- defined
"consistent degradation" of a partisan
group's electoral influence.
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Doing our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" and an Exegesis into
the Judicial Role
Notre Dame Law Review
January, 2003
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
3. Back to Baker: Davis v. Bandemer
Three years later, the Court finally
confronted the hated gerrymander. The
setting this time was the Indiana redistricting
process; the case was Davis v. Bandemer. 5 1
In Bandemer, the plaintiffs brought a
challenge to the state reapportionment plan,
alleging that the enacted plan had been
drafted in order to disadvantage the
Democratic Party and its delegates.
According to their claim, "each political
group in a State should have the same
chance to elect representatives of its choice
as any other political group." Put differently,
the claim here is that "Democratic voters
over the State as a whole, not Democratic
voters in particular districts, have been
subjected to unconstitutional
discrimination." Put this way, the question
of political representation arises quite
forcefully. Unsurprisingly, the Court's
answer to this decidedly complex question
left a lot to be desired.
Declaring this claim a justiciable one, a
Court plurality held that the plaintiffs must
"prove both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an
actual discriminatory effect on that group"
in order to prove their claim. The
intentionality inquiry poses modest
requirements; after all, "[a]s long as
redistricting is done by a legislature, it
should not be very difficult to prove that the
likely political consequences of the
reapportionment were intended." The
effects prong has proven to be far more
cryptic. In the Court's words:
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs
when the electoral system is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter
or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole. . . . [T]he
question is whether a particular group has
been unconstitutionally denied its chance to
effectively influence the political process...
In this context, such a finding of
unconstitutionality must be supported by
evidence of continued frustration of the will
of a majority of the voters or effective denial
to a minority of voters of a fair chance to
influence the political process.
Under this exigent test, political
gerrymanders are unconstitutional in their
most egregious forms. It is not enough for
the plaintiffs to claim that they lost a
political battle or a series of elections.
According to the Court, the plaintiffs must
show a political process breakdown where
the system could no longer, by any sensible
account, be called democratic. Bandemer
thus signals a judicial propensity to
safeguard the democratic process gingerly.
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... 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
As long as the process functions properly,
the Court will remain uninvolved; only
when the process malfunctions, to the point
of collapse, will the Court intervene and
afford litigants a remedy, in the name of
democratic principles.
Seen this way, one may analogize the
Court's position in Bandemer to a market
scenario, in the sense that benefits to
consumers are best reflected in healthy,
robust competition in a free market. Once a
firm achieves its goals too well and
monopolizes its given field, however,
federal law is immediately implicated.
Similarly, Bandemer calls for judicial
intervention only when redistricters do their
jobs too well. Due to the difficulties
inherent in the redistricting task, this will not
happen often. To some, this is Bandemer's
undoing; to my mind, therein lies its virtue.
Curiously, the scholarly commentary on
Bandemer is predominantly critical of the
Court's position. In general, critics
complain not that Bandemer is an
unwelcome intrusion into political matters,
but, puzzlingly, that Bandemer does not
extend the Court's doctrinal venture far
enough. As one critic put this point, "it is a
necessary accompaniment to the one person,
one vote accomplishment to make sure that
election procedures are truly fair." Another
such critic explained, in my view more
sensibly, "the ultimate test of Davis v.
Bandemer will be determined by its ability
to provide relief from egregious political
gerrymandering without exposing virtually
every districting plan to tedious and
unnecessary judicial scrutiny." These
accounts posit the Court as democratic
arbiter, as the only institution with both the
will and the wherewithal to police the
combustible arena of political
reapportionment.
These criticisms have gained much
currency in recent years. This Section takes
direct issue with them. To be clear, it
concedes the prior point, whether the Court
could develop useful standards in this area
without subjecting our political institutions
to a system of proportional representation.
On this point, the critics are both ready and
willing to provide standards, and this
Section does not dispute them. The better
question is whether the Court should
intervene in these highly political contests.
The answer is not as facile as many critics
periodically posit. As a result, this Section
sidesteps the critics' contention that
Bandemer's doctrine is practically non-
existent in any useful sense. It is true that
federal courts have only once struck down a
redistricting plan on Bandemer grounds.165
This is a function of the Court's
understanding of democratic politics; by
definition the question of "egregious"
gerrymanders will necessitate the enduring
control of a state majority by one party.
This is very difficult to do, perhaps
impossible. Seen this way, Bandemer is
thus a case for relaxed standards and
161 See Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
950-58 (4th Cir. 1992). This case is important for
many reasons, particularly for the way in which it
highlights the philosophical differences between
defenders of an aggressive posture to judicial review
of politics and the more passive model I defend here.
Soon after the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court
finding of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander,
the Republican party managed to stage a comeback in
the midterm elections, obtaining a legislative
majority in the state House for the first time in this
century. See Edward Walsh, North Carolina Reflects
Voting Shift in South: GOP Takeover Nov. 8 Both
Wide and Deep, Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 1994, at Al.
Professor Issacharoff brands this judicial incursion an
"embarrassment," Issacharoff, supra note 11
(manuscript at 11-12, on file with author), and I do
not disagree with the label. To his mind, this means
that the case law must provide clearer standards by
which to guide lower courts; to my mind, in contrast,
this means that courts must play a very passive role.
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intervention only for extreme cases, as
Grofman's words intimate and others have
accurately forecasted. On this reading, I
have yet to see a case that calls for judicial
intervention. Interestingly, neither has the
Court.169
Before turning to and answering some of
the leading objections to the partisan
gerrymandering doctrine, it is worth pausing
briefly to underline the current state of the
doctrine. In light of Davis v. Bandemer,170
it is clear that the Court now has at least a
semblance of a theory of democratic
politics. This is the lockout theory, which
worries whether groups have been
completely shut out of the political process,
The Court's initial entry into the redistricting
thicket was influenced in great measure by
this problem, as political and geographical
minorities in state legislatures simply
refused to release their strangleholds on state
power. We saw this problem in Tennessee
pre-Baker and in Alabama pre-Reynolds,
among others. In Baker, for example,
Justice Clark did not side with the ultimate
majority on the question of judicial
intervention until he was convinced that the
courts were the only institution capable of
dislodging the existing power glut. In
Reynolds, the district court took a similar
view of the facts at issue, and in so doing
sought to "releas[e] the strangle hold on the
legislature sufficiently so as to permit the
newly elected body to enact a
constitutionally valid and permanent
169 Consistent with early warnings of the Court's role
in political matters, the plaintiffs must meet a very
high standard. These claims, while justiciable, will
not carry the day under most circumstances. See
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 669-71 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (three-judge court), affd, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989).
170 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
reapportionment plan." 72 On my reading of
Bandemer, this is exactly the view of
democratic politics pursued by the plurality.
Short of a lockout, the political process
should be left alone.
Further, it is worth keeping in mind two of
the central premises of this Article: that all
redistricting is gerrymandering and that
redistricting raises difficult and contested
political questions of the highest order. It is
also worth remembering Justice Douglas's
observation that the gerrymandering
question is "the other half of Reynolds v.
Sims." 74 In many important respects, these
views are ref lected in the argument to this
point. Its conclusion is also mindful of this
reality. More specifically, we must treat the
redistricting and gerrymandering questions
together, for they are but two sides of the
same coin. In doing so, this Article
contends that the proper doctrinal approach
is to adopt a de minimis standard across the
board (which will take care of all future
Karchers) and then apply Bandemer across
the board.
172 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 543 (1964).
174 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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